

CPA TALK 6

Ian Martin

Former Head, United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

The ultimate success principle for a peace process is whether it brings peace, and whether that peace will endure. It was the tenth year of a civil war with terrible consequences for non-combatants in the villages, a history of failed negotiations, and no clear path to peace in 2005. Today, there is no armed conflict, there have been elections which clearly expressed the will of the majority, and power has been transferred peacefully. The root causes of conflict should be addressed, institutions reformed, and reconciliation and justice promoted to secure lasting peace.

The CPA was a highly ambitious document with commitments to ‘a progressive restructuring of the state to resolve the existing problems based on class, caste, region and gender’, and to ‘ensure progressive political, economic and social transformation’. The continuing dissatisfaction of marginalized groups with the constitution and tensions over transitional justice are indications of what still needs to be resolved and political actors still seem more preoccupied with jostling for office than with cooperating to deliver on the promise of social and economic progress.

A major weakness of the peace process is that despite repeated agreements among the parties to establish an all-party mechanism to review overall implementation of the CPA, they never created one; and control of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction went from one political party to another with the change in government.

The most effective peace process implementation mechanism was the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, chaired by UNMIN in accordance with the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies, which had been negotiated under the UN facilitation. UNMIN was not a party to negotiations on integration as it was only given a mandate to monitor the management of arms and armies. The Interim Constitution required the Council of Ministers to establish a special committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the combatants of the Maoist Army. UNMIN pressed for the special committee to be established and offered to provide it with technical advice, so that an early exit strategy for the mission could be planned.

The UN always had good access to the multiple actors, and this began before the formal peace process, through the contacts of the UN Department of Political and through OHCHR in Nepal. Nepali civil society actors made a huge contribution in the period of the 12-Point Agreement, the Janandolan and the negotiation of the CPA.

[For further information regarding the book, contact Nepal Transition to Peace Institute \(NTTP-I\) or send an email to contact @nttpinstitute.org.np.](http://nttpinstitute.org.np)